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Article 
Distinction and Proportionality in Cyberwar: 
Virtual Problems with a Real Solution 
CDR Peter Pascucci, JAGC, U.S. Navy 
Executive Summary 
Cyberwar raises unique issues in the application of 
international humanitarian law (“IHL”). Numerous 
commentators and States have concluded that IHL applies to 
cyberwar, but the only detailed description of how IHL may be 
applied is in the Tallinn Manual.1 However, the Tallinn Manual 
was written by an international group of experts, not States. 
Even under the Tallinn Manual application, the principles of 
distinction and proportionality fail to adequately protect 
civilians and civilian objects. Specifically, IHL is deficient in 
protecting civilians and civilian objects because: (1) the 
application and scope of the definition of what constitutes a 
civilian object versus military objective in cyberwar is unclear, 
particularly with respect to data and the functionality of cyber 
systems; (2) the definition of what constitutes an attack fails to 
adequately account for non-kinetic effects; (3) the definition of 
damage and the guidance for calculating damage in cyberwar is 
 
  The author is an active duty judge advocate with the U.S. Navy and is 
a National Security Crisis Law fellow with the Center on National Security and 
the Law at Georgetown University Law Center. A previous version of this 
Article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the award of 
the degree of Master of Laws from the Georgetown University Law Center. This 
Article was selected as the runner up for the 106 Lieber Society Richard R. 
Baxter Writing prize. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author 
and do not reflect the views or opinions of the Department of the Navy, the 
Department of Defense, or Georgetown University Law Center. 
 1. While the United States Department of Defense has published a Law 
of War manual that includes a cyberspace operations chapter, discussed further 
infra, the manual fails to offer the level of detail and certainty in opinion that 
is necessary to afford benefit to practitioners and comprehensive understanding 
to the international community. That being said, it is a significant step further 
than any other country has taken in detailing the analysis of the application of 
the law of armed conflict to cyberspace operations. 
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vague; and (4) there is a lack of guidance for assessing the extent 
to which indirect effects must be accounted in a proportionality 
analysis. 
The principle of distinction requires a party to the conflict 
to target only other parties to the conflict—a party may not 
target a civilian or civilian object. Specifically, Article 48 of 
Additional Protocol I (“AP I”) establishes this basic rule.2 This 
foundational principle is further emphasized in Articles 51 and 
52 of AP I to protect civilians and civilian objects.3 Applying AP 
I to cyberwar yields results that simply do not provide adequate 
protection for civilians and civilian objects. This is a direct result 
of the unique and ubiquitous nature of cyber systems and the 
reliance on and use of civilian cyber systems by military forces. 
Additionally, the lack of identifiable standards or thresholds, 
such as the degree of fidelity required for future use of 
infrastructure for it to be targetable, further adds to the 
confusion. Moreover, data is not traditionally considered an 
“object.”4 Therefore, so long as an attack does not impair the 
underlying functionality of a system, but merely corrupts data, 
IHL offers inadequate protection. Finally, the definition of 
“attack” for purposes of IHL, as applied in cyberspace, is less 
than clear. Similar problems occur under the existing 
proportionality analysis. 
Article 51 of AP I prohibits an attack that may be expected 
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage 
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.5 In cyberwar, the overarching question 
as to the success of the principle of proportionality in protecting 
the civilian population will largely turn on what the specific 
terms mean within the principle of proportionality, and how they 
are applied to cyber attacks. Thus, the definitional issues 
 
 2. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 
48, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. 
 3. Id. arts. 51, 52. 
 4. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
CYBER OPERATIONS 437 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter 
TALLINN MANUAL]. Of note, in February 2017, the authors of the Tallinn 
Manual published the second edition. The second edition focused on the 
application of international law to cyber activities during peacetime (i.e., those 
activities that fall short of the jus ad bellum threshold). In addition, there were 
some changes made to the rules and commentary from the original Tallinn 
manual. 
 5. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 51. 
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associated with what constitutes a military object, as discussed 
with respect to distinction, pertain in the proportionality 
analysis as well. Additionally, there is no established collateral 
effect (damage) estimation methodology, causing all 
assessments to be subjective and largely inconsistent. 
Furthermore, it remains unclear to what degree knock-on or 
indirect effects must be considered. 
The solution to these problems is Additional Protocol IV. 
While a new, comprehensive cyberspace treaty is neither 
necessary nor politically likely, a limited-in-scope additional 
protocol that seeks to clarify the definitions and application of 
key terms with respect to cyberwar is necessary, appropriate, 
and politically feasible. Specifically, Additional Protocol IV 
should clearly delineate what constitutes a civilian object versus 
a military objective in cyberspace, including how to calculate 
damage in cyberwar, and determine the scope and extent to 
which indirect or knock-on effects must be considered.6 
Additional Protocol IV will provide clarity and precision in terms 
that are vital to the success and consistent application of the IHL 
principles of distinction and proportionality. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“[S]upreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s 
resistance without fighting.”7 Cyberwar offers the ability to 
subdue the enemy without engaging in traditional kinetic 
battles.8 However, whether a cyber attack constitutes a jus in 
bello ‘attack’9 under IHL is one of the many aspects of 
international law that remains murky in the age of digital 
warfare. “Many difficult questions arise when trying to fit 
cyberspace within a warfare regime constructed long before even 
the most visionary policy makers imagined cyber weapons.”10 
This Article will address the jus in bello principles of distinction 
 
 6. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Protocol IV]. 
 7. SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 11 (Lionel Giles trans., 2010). 
 8. See generally Matthew Borton, Samuel Liles & Sydney Liles, Cyberwar 
Policy, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 303, 305 (2010) (defining 
cyberwarfare from an extrapolation of other terms as “any military operation 
designed to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and/or defend 
through the information infrastructure with a desired kinetic effect”). 
 9. As distinguished from an ‘attack’ in the jus ad bellum construct. 
 10. Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, 30 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 525, 579 (2012). 
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and proportionality, as applied to cyberwar, and will 
demonstrate that the present structure of IHL and current 
interpretation fails to fulfill the spirit of adequately protecting 
civilians from the harms of war. 
Part II of this Article will explore the current technology and 
its ubiquity, and the uncertain nature of law and policy in 
cyberspace. Part III analyzes cyberwar in the context of IHL, 
focusing on the principles of distinction and proportionality. 
After analyzing the shortcomings of the principles of distinction 
and proportionality in cyberwar in Part III, Part IV addresses 
possible solutions that establish clarity in applying the 
principles of IHL while upholding the spirit of protecting 
civilians from the harms of war. While some commentators have 
focused on when a State may resort to armed force, including in 
cyberspace, (i.e., jus ad bellum),11 this Article focuses on the 
application of two key principles of IHL—distinction and 
proportionality—in an armed conflict where the methodology of 
attack is cyberwar. Therefore, the Article will not discuss the jus 
ad bellum analysis nor draw a distinction between an 
international armed conflict (“IAC”) and a non-international 
armed conflict (“NIAC”), unless otherwise referenced. Finally, 
the principal use of cyberwar is against objects and, as such, this 
Article will not focus on the specific targeting of people. 
However, the impact of cyberwar on the civilian population will 
be addressed in the application of the principles of distinction 
and proportionality. 
II. CYBERSPACE: UBIQUITOUS AND UNCERTAIN 
Any analysis of the application of the principles of IHL to a 
technology-based style of warfare must begin with a basic 
understanding of the technology at issue. “The invention of the 
telegraph, telephone, radio, and computer set the stage for this 
unprecedented integration of capabilities.”12 Originally 
 
 11. See, e.g., HEATHER HARRISON DINNISS, CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS 
OF WAR 118 (2012); William Banks, The Role of Counterterrorism Law in 
Shaping ad Bellum Norms for Cyber Warfare, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 157 (2013) 
(analyzing when cyberwar is justified in response to cyber terrorist attacks); 
Reese Nguyen, Navigating Jus Ad Bellum in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 101 CAL. 
L. REV. 1079 (2013) (arguing a new framework to analyze whether the use of 
force is justified by shifting from an object-based definition of cyberwar). 
 12. BARRY M. LEINER ET AL., INTERNET SOC’Y, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 
INTERNET 1 (2012) [hereinafter LEINER ET AL.], http://www.internetsociety.org/
sites/default/files/Brief_History_of_the_Internet.pdf. 
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conceived as a way for academic researchers to share 
information, the internet, and by extension internets and 
networks, have transformed significantly over the past thirty 
years.13 In an overly simplistic fashion, a network is comprised 
of computers, switches, routers, servers, printers, smart phones, 
and/or other devices that allow users to transmit, receive, and/or 
store information.14 The Internet refers to the world-wide web 
and is the combination of all interconnected networks.15 The 
transmission and receipt of information (i.e., data) across diverse 
platforms (i.e., computers, smart phones, etc.) relies upon the 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (“TCP/IP”).16 
The TCP/IP protocol is what allows your Apple iPhone to talk 
seamlessly with your Samsung laptop, and to obtain information 
from a Cisco server.17 This basic explanation of networking and 
technology, though oversimplified for a computer scientist, 
demonstrates the man-made nature of cyberspace, and the ease 
of interconnectedness. However, one need not possess a 
computer science degree to intelligently discuss the applicable 
principles of international humanitarian law to this technology. 
The technology is relevant to the discussion because of what it 
does: transmits, stores, and controls information. The nature of 
the technology and its integration into military systems leads to 
the likelihood of cyberwar.18 “[V]irtually the U.S.’s entire 
infrastructure including dams, nuclear power plants, air-traffic 
control, communications, and financial institutions” rely on 
cyberspace.19 But technology alone does not cause a commander 
to want to target something—it is what may be done with that 
technology, or what information resides on it, that leads to 
targeting. 
 
 13. See id. at 8. 
 14. See What is a Network?, FLA. CTR. FOR INSTRUCTIONAL TECH., 
http://fcit.usf.edu/network/chap1/chap1 (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 15. See What is the Internet?, GOV’T AUSTL. DEP’T COMM., http://web
archive.nla.gov.au/gov/20150227175730/http://www.internetbasics.gov.au/getti
ng_started_on_the_internet/what_is_the_internet# (last visited Feb. 19, 2017). 
 16. LEINER ET AL., supra note 12, at 4. 
 17. See Robert Sanchez, What is TCP/IP and How Does it Make the Internet 
Work?, HOSTINGADVICE.COM (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.hostingadvice.com/
blog/tcpip-make-internet-work/. 
 18. See DAVID S. ALBERTS, JOHN J. GARSTKA & FREDERICK P. STEIN, 
NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE: DEVELOPING AND LEVERAGING INFORMATION 
SUPERIORITY (2d ed. 2000). 
 19. Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber 
Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192, 200 (2009). 
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The technological transformation and integration of 
capabilities has significantly increased the speed at which 
information is transferred and the ease of access to vast 
quantities of data.20 “Across a broad range of activities and 
operations, the time required by individuals to access or collect 
the information relevant to a decision or action has been reduced 
by orders of magnitude . . . .”21 This makes information warfare 
ever more likely because “[t]he increasing availability and 
affordability of information, information technologies, and 
Information Age weapons increases the potential for creating 
formidable foes from impotent adversaries.”22 This is evident in 
the pervasive nature of interconnectedness among military and 
civilian systems, and the reliance of the military on civilian 
infrastructure.23 Critical national security and public safety 
systems are connected, including air traffic control, oil and gas 
pipelines, electrical generating and transmission systems, 
hospital systems, emergency services, transportation systems, 
GPS satellites, financial systems, agricultural systems, and 
other critical infrastructure.24 The ubiquitous nature of 
cyberspace has branched out into consumer goods including 
refrigerators, microwaves, thermostats, watches, and other 
traditionally non-internet connected items—the “Internet of 
Things.”25 Thus everyday items, from appliances to vehicles to 
commercial systems, are networked and connected to the 
internet.26 “As more and more information becomes digitised 
[sic] and bandwidth expands, societies have become increasingly 
reliant on networked and electronic information,”27 thus 
significantly increasing the quantity of potential military 
objectives and the ease with which States and non-State actors 
may achieve objectives by cyber means. As a result, “cyberspace 
 
 20. See ALBERTS, GARSTKA & STEIN, supra note 18, at 15. 
 21. Id. at 16. 
 22. Id. at 19. 
 23. Id. at 59. 
 24. DINNISS, supra note 11, at 12–13; see also Exec. Order No. 13636, 3 
C.F.R. § 217 (2014) (taking action to improve cybersecurity on critical 
infrastructure). 
 25. See The Internet of Things (IoT) Starts with Intel Inside, INTEL, 
http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/internet-of-things/overview.html
?cid=sem132p41961g-c&gclid=Cj0KEQjwlYqoBRDajuaTvsyq1PQBEiQ
AEhSjnLm_Ziki856GKchA07tUq-cecD2SqtmIMhOvE56NGLQaAqZI8P8HAQ 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2017); see also INTERNET THINGS COUNCIL, http://www.the
internetofthings.eu/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 26. DINNISS, supra note 11, at 12. 
 27. Id. 
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has gone from being an ornament of interest to forming a real 
pillar in national security efforts.”28 It is these pillars that States 
will consider as potential military targets in the event of armed 
conflict. “Over 120 countries have developed information 
operations systems” (cyber attack capabilities).29 
The explosion of technology and the dramatic increase in 
States developing cyberwarfare capabilities is not merely for 
future use. States have already engaged in warfare by cyber 
means. On a strategic level there are examples: Stuxnet30 and 
the Russian-Georgian cyber conflict.31 However, cyberwar has 
also been used on a more tactical level. The United States used 
tactical cyber operations in the war against ISIL and in 
Afghanistan. 32 According to Lt. General Richard Mills of the 
United States Marine Corps, in 2010 the United States used 
cyber operations to “get inside [the enemy’s] nets, infect [the 
enemy’s] command-and-control, and in fact defend [United 
States forces] against [the enemy’s] almost constant 
incursions . . . “ inside United States forces’ networks, to affect 
United States’ operations.33 Thus, cyberwar may be used from 
the strategic level to the tactical level of warfare, all based upon 
desired effect and target selection. 
 
 28. PAUL ROSENZWEIG, AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAW AND 
NAT’L SEC. & NAT’L STRATEGY FORUM, NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS IN 
CYBERSPACE 10 (2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/2011_build/law_national_security/threats_in_cyberspace_report.aut
hcheckdam.pdf. 
 29. Jeremy Richmond, Note, Evolving Battlefields: Does Stuxnet 
Demonstrate a Need for Modifications to the Law of Armed Conflict?, 35 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 842, 846 (2012). 
 30. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyber Attacks 
Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/
world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html 
(describing the attacks on Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities). 
 31. See, e.g., Lesley Swanson, The Era of Cyber Warfare: Applying 
International Humanitarian Law to the 2008 Russian-Georgian Cyber Conflict, 
32 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 305 (2010) (detailing the Russian-
Georgian cyber conflict). 
 32. See Press Release, Ash Carter, Sec’y of Defense, Department of Defense 
Press Briefing (Feb. 29, 2016) (transcript available at https://www.defense.gov/
News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/682341/department-of-defense-
press-briefing-by-secretary-carter-and-gen-dunford-in-the); Tom Fox-Brewster, 
Cyber-Warfare: Who’s Afraid of the Big Red Button?, INFOSECURITY MAG. (Oct. 
31, 2014), http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/magazine-features/cyber
warfare-whos-afraid-of-the/. 
 33. Fox-Brewster, supra note 32 (quoting Lieutenant General Richard 
Mills of the United States Marine Corps). 
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Despite the prevalence and importance of cyberspace in 
national security affairs, the applicable international law, and 
more importantly, the precise application of the relevant 
provisions of international law, remain unclear.34 Existing 
international treaties relating to or impacted by cyber 
operations do not specify how they apply in the event of an 
armed conflict.35 Publicly, the United States declared that the 
same principles of law and policy that govern kinetic operations 
govern cyber operations.36 However, when asked specifically 
how they apply, Admiral Michael Rogers, now Commander of 
United States Cyber Command, provided a generalized answer 
that did not directly answer the question. Specifically, Admiral 
Rogers was asked by the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Has the Department of Defense determined how the laws 
of armed conflict (including the principles of military 
necessity in choosing targets, proportionality with 
respect to collateral damage and unintended 
consequences, and distinguishing between combatants 
and non-combatants) apply to cyber warfare, with 
respect to both nation-states and non-state entities 
(terrorists, criminals), and both when the source of an 
attack is known and unknown?37 
Admiral Rogers responded, “[p]er [Department of Defense] 
guidance, all military operations must be in compliance with the 
 
 34. See Borton, Liles & Liles, supra note 8, at 304–05 (stating that experts 
disagree on the range and scope of cyberwarfare and that there are calls for 
policy as well as conflicting views of existing policy); see also Swanson, supra 
note 31, at 305 (stating that existing principles of international law need to be 
applied in new ways and old tenets reconsidered). 
 35. See Shackelford, supra note 19, at 198–99 (discussing how a cyber 
attack could implicate provisions of, inter alia, the International 
Telecommunications Union, matters of copyright infringement, and UNCLOS 
articles 19 and 113, and how these provisions do not specify the way they apply 
to armed conflict or lack enforcement mechanisms). 
 36. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 16.2 (2015) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL]; Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, International 
Law in Cyberspace 3 (Sept. 18, 2012) (transcript available at 
http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Koh-Speech-to-
Publish1.pdf). 
 37. U. S. SENATE COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., ADVANCE QUESTIONS FOR VICE 
ADMIRAL MICHAEL S. ROGERS, USN NOMINEE FOR COMMANDER, UNITED 
STATES CYBER COMMAND 14 (2014), http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/Rogers_03-11-14.pdf [hereinafter ADVANCE QUESTIONS]. 
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laws of armed conflict-this includes cyber operations. The law of 
war principles of military necessity, proportionality and 
distinction will apply when conducting cyber operations.”38 The 
reason for the lack of a precise response to the foregoing question 
is unclear. In 2015, the United States Department of Defense 
(“DOD”) published a manual on the Law of War that includes a 
chapter dedicated to cyber operations.39 Even though an 
important first step for the United States DOD, the manual 
dedicates only six pages to the application of jus in bello 
principles to cyberspace operations.40 Although indicative of 
DOD’s intent, the content on these six pages does not definitively 
clarify the application of these principles to be of practical use to 
practitioners. Nor do these six pages provide any degree of 
certainty to the international community as to how, precisely, 
the United States will interpret its international obligations. 
Nevertheless, there are no internationally agreed-upon set of 
rules for cyberwar.41 Even the framework for discussing the 
application of international law to cyberwar remains elusive. As 
recently as 2014, representatives at the United Nations were 
still calling for States to agree on “specific transparency and 
confidence-building measures.”42 Additionally, in 2014, the 
European Union referred to the lack of precise definitions and 
policy pertaining to cyberwar as a “black hole.”43 Most recently, 
in November 2016 at University of California Berkeley, Brian 
Egan, Legal Advisor at the United States State Department, 
built upon the 2012 Harold Koh speech regarding the application 
of the Laws of Armed Combat (“LOAC”) in cyberwar. Egan’s 
speech, too, failed to provide any meaningful clarification or 
insight of specific positions of the United States on the 
application of specific jus in bello principles.44 
 
 38. Id.; see also DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 36, § 16.2. 
 39. Id. at 994–1006. 
 40. Id. at 1003–08. 
 41. Fox-Brewster, supra note 32. 
 42. Press Release, General Assembly, Cyber Warfare, Unchecked, Could 
Topple Entire Edifice of International Security, Says Speaker in First 
Committee at Conclusion of Thematic Debate Segment, U.N. Press Release 
GA/DIS/3512 (Oct. 28, 2014). 
 43. CARMEN-CRISTINA CIRLIG, CYBER DEFENCE IN THE EU: PREPARING FOR 
CYBER WARFARE? 3 (Oct. 2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/BRIE/2014/542143/EPRS_BRI(2014)542143_REV1_EN.pdf. 
 44. See Brian Egan, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks on 
International Law and Stability in Cyberspace 3–5, (Nov. 10, 2016) (transcript 
available at https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Brian-J.-
Egan-International-Law-and-Stability-in-Cyberspace-Berkeley-Nov-2016.pdf); 
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Despite the uncertainty of the precise application of existing 
international law, the number of countries engaged in or 
preparing to engage in cyberwar has increased dramatically to 
100 countries developing cyber military commands.45 These 
countries include “about 20 that are serious players, and a 
smaller number could carry out a whole cyberwar campaign.”46 
Seemingly, the only progress in defining precise terms and 
exacting an explanation of the application of IHL in cyberwar 
comes from the Tallinn Manual.47 However, the Tallinn Manual 
reflects the work of an international group of experts—not the 
efforts of States that are the principal architects of international 
law and would be the primary actors in cyberwar.48 Additionally, 
in numerous topics within the Tallinn Manual, even the experts 
could not reach a consensus or agreement on precise tactical 
applications of IHL principles.49 
The lack of clear and well-defined international law is 
particularly troubling as more State and non-State actors 
engage in conduct through cyberspace.50 This is a direct result of 
the low costs associated with the entry and ability to reach 
world-wide without leaving the safety and security of one’s 
territory.51 Finally, the technology allows a State or non-State 
group to obfuscate—to varying degrees depending upon whom 
you believe—its actual identity when engaging in cyber 
operations, thus furnishing anonymity of the actor.52 
 
see also Michael Schmitt, U.S. Transparency Regarding International Law in 
Cyberspace, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 15, 2016, 9:11 AM), https://www.just
security.org/34465/transparency-international-law-cyberspace/ (providing 
additional analysis on Brian Egan’s remarks). 
 45. Steve Ranger, Inside the Secret Digital Arms Race: Facing the Threat of 
a Global Cyberwar, TECHREPUBLIC (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.tech
republic.com/article/inside-the-secret-digital-arms-race/. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4. 
 48. Id. at 2. 
 49. See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Book Review, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 585, 586 
(2014) (reviewing TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE 
TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013)). 
 50. Ranger, supra note 45; Laurie R. Blank, International Law and Cyber 
Threats from Non-State Actors, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 406, 407 (2013). 
 51. See Swanson, supra note 31, at 304; Michael N. Schmitt, Computer 
Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a 
Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 897 (1999). 
 52. See Shackelford, supra note 19, at 200–01 (discussing the practical and 
fundamental problem of attribution); Koh, supra note 36, at 6. But see ADVANCE 
QUESTIONS, supra note 37, at 19 (stating attribution is improved but is not 
timely in many circumstances). 
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Despite the advancing technology and uncertainty with the 
precise application of international law, there is consensus 
among States and experts that principles of international law, 
including IHL in situations of armed conflict, apply to actions in 
cyberspace.53 However, there is little consensus on how 
international law, and IHL in particular, will apply to cyberwar 
in practice.54 
III. CYBERWAR AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 
A. OVERVIEW OF IHL 
“The laws of armed conflict apply to all situations of armed 
conflict, whether or not war is declared, and regardless of 
whether the parties involved recognise [sic] the state of armed 
conflict or, indeed, the opposing force.”55 Although the preceding 
statement seems unambiguous, as with many aspects of law 
applied to cyberwar, the determination that IHL applies to 
cyberwar is not without question.56 This is, in part, due to the 
fact that no specific provision in IHL expressly applies to 
cyberwar.57 Presently, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (“ICRC”), a majority of international experts, and a 
growing number of States have concluded that, when engaged in 
an armed conflict, IHL applies to cyber attacks.58 However, 
 
 53. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 2, 375; U.N. Secretary-General, 
Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, Section VI. ¶ 
28(d), U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015) (stating that as a matter of 
international law, principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality, and 
distinction apply to information and communications technology, i.e., 
cyberwar); Koh, supra note 36, at 2–3. 
 54. See generally TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 2–6 (describing 
generally the process by which the international group of experts drew 
conclusions as to exact applications or scope of a treaty and its applicability to 
cyber space); U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 53, at Sec. III ¶ 9 (“The ICT 
environment offers . . . challenges to the international community in 
determining how norms, rules and principles can apply to State conduct of ICT-
related activities.”). 
 55. DINNISS, supra note 11, at 117. 
 56. Id. at 126. 
 57. Richmond, supra note 29, at 847. 
 58. See DINNISS, supra note 11, at 126, 128, 137; DOD LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL, supra note 36, § 16.2; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 375; Jody 
M. Prescott, The Law of Armed Conflict and the Responsible Cyber Commander, 
38 VT. L. REV. 103, 109–11 (2013) (describing that in addition to the United 
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conspicuously absent from any of the pronouncements (except 
for the Tallinn Manual), is a detailed description of how IHL 
shall apply. Therefore, before analyzing specific IHL principles 
in the cyberwar paradigm, one must first look at the key IHL 
principles and the underlying purpose of IHL. 
B. DISTINCTION IN CYBERWAR 
Although the premise remains that all principles of IHL are 
applicable in cyberwar, the application of the principle of 
distinction raises unique issues. This section explores the 
principle of distinction, the application of distinction in 
cyberwar, and the specific attributes of the principle of 
distinction that, as applied, fail to adequately protect civilians. 
1. General Description of Distinction 
Distinction is a seminal principle in international 
humanitarian law.59 The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
has characterized the principle of distinction as 
“intransgressible.”60 Additionally, the principle of distinction is 
considered customary international law and applicable in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts.61 The 
principle of distinction requires a party to the conflict to only 
target other parties to the conflict—a party may not target a 
civilian or civilian object.62 Specifically, Article 48 of AP I 
 
States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands apply the Law of Armed 
Conflict (i.e. IHL) in cyberwar but China is reluctant to state that IHL applies); 
Adam Segal, China, International Law, and Cyberspace, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL. (Oct. 2, 2012), http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/10/02/china-international-law-
and-cyberspace/ (explaining the United Kingdom, as well as the United States, 
applies existing international humanitarian law, but China, Russia, Tajikistan, 
and Uzbekistan believe a new treaty is required); Cordula Droege, No Legal 
Vacuum in Cyber Space, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Aug. 16, 2011), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2011/cyber-warfare-
interview-2011-08-16.htm; Koh, supra note 36, at 2–3 (stating that the Law of 
Armed Conflict (i.e. IHL) applies to cyber attacks). 
 59. Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International 
Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics, HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. (Feb. 5, 
2013, 2:07 PM), http://harvardnsj.org/2013/02/autonomous-weapon-systems-
and-international-humanitarian-law-a-reply-to-the-critics/. 
 60. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶¶ 78, 79 (July 8). 
 61. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOLUME I: RULES 3 (2009). 
 62. Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: 
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establishes the general rule: “[i]n order to ensure respect for and 
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the 
Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the 
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects 
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives.”63 Article 48 sets a 
foundational rule upon which the protection of civilians from the 
harms of hostilities is based. This foundational principle is 
further emphasized in Article 52(1) which is designed to protect 
civilian objects.64 
Civilian objects are those that are not military objects.65 
Article 52 defines military objects as “those objects which by 
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances 
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”66 Thus, 
Article 52 espouses a two-part test for determining the 
lawfulness of an object as a military object: (1) objectively, the 
nature, location, purpose, or use must make an effective military 
contribution; and (2) the destruction, capture, or neutralization, 
under the circumstances at the time, must offer a definite 
military advantage.67 
2. Application of Distinction to Cyber Warfare 
a. Military Objectives vs. Civilian Objects 
While the principle of distinction appears straight-forward, 
its application to cyberwar is ambiguous. In cyberwar, increased 
reliance on civilian and commercial facilities and equipment 
blurs the distinction between civilian objects and military 
 
Operationalizing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT’L 
SECURITY J. 45, 54 (2010). 
 63. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 48. 
 64. Id. art. 52(1). While Article 51(2) of AP I further details the rule 
espoused in Article 48 with respect to the civilian population, because the 
specific targeting of civilians (i.e., individuals, as opposed to objects) by 
cyberwar is not a focus of this Article, the analysis of the principle of distinction 
will not significantly rely upon Article 51. 
 65. See id. art. 52(1). 
 66. Id. art. 52(2). 
 67. See id. art. 52; see also Robin Geiβ & Henning Lahmann, Cyber Warfare: 
Applying the Principle of Distinction in an Interconnected Space, 45 ISR. L. REV. 
381, 387 (2012). 
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objectives, and thus the initial determination of lawfulness.68 In 
this regard, the key is the nexus between the military objective 
and the object a commander seeks to attack. This is where the 
nature of cyberspace—the interconnectedness, built-in 
resiliency of the communications pathways, and the reliance on 
civilian systems and off-the-shelf hardware and software—
complicates the analysis.69 
Further complicating the distinction analysis is the nature 
of data. Whether data, per se and regardless of nature, location, 
purpose, or use, may be considered an object—let alone 
characterized as either a military objective or civilian object—
remains in controversy.70 While the literature fails to identify 
any State’s position with respect to data as a potential “object,” 
a majority of experts involved in the creation of the Tallinn 
Manual concluded that for the purposes of IHL data should not, 
in most cases, be considered an object.71 The Tallinn Manual 
reaches this conclusion by viewing data as “intangible,” and 
therefore outside the “ordinary meaning of the term object.”72 
The experts further opined that inclusion of data as an object 
would not comport with the ICRC Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols.73 Thus, a cyber operation directed at 
manipulating, destroying, or corrupting data resident on a 
computer or cyber system that does not affect functionality of the 
computer or system itself does not constitute an attack on an 
object. 74 This seemingly expansive gap in what constitutes an 
object is minimally limited by the experts’ conclusion that a 
cyber operation targeting data that affects the functionality of 
computers or cyber systems may “sometimes” qualify as an 
attack.75 In an information-driven society, such as the United 
States, this gap could have a profound effect, especially if it 
means that an action that results in corruption or destruction of 
 
 68. See Richmond, supra note 29, at 875. 
 69. See Geiβ & Lahmann, supra note 67, at 388. 
 70. Michael N. Schmitt & Eric W. Widmar, “On Target”: Precision and 
Balance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 
379, 395 (2014); see also Noam Lubell, Lawful Targets in Cyber Operations: Does 
the Principle of Distinction Apply?, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 252, 268–269 (2013). 
 71. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 437. 
 72. See id. (citing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 
1980)). 
 73. See id. 
 74. See generally infra Part III C.2a for additional discussion on 
functionality. 
 75. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 437. 
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all the data on a civilian computer or cyber system, except for 
the operating system and functionality supporting software, is 
outside the scope of the principle of distinction. 
There is little doubt that “[m]ilitary objectives in cyberspace 
can include computers, computer networks, and other tangible 
components of cyber infrastructure . . . .”76 In fact, “[m]ilitary 
use of a computer has to be understood in its widest possible 
meaning, running the whole gamut from the plotting of 
attacks—through the crunching or storage of military data and 
the encryption or deciphering of codes—to plain administrative 
military tasks.”77 
b. Contribution to Military Action 
Applying the principle of distinction to cyberwar, one must 
distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. In 
other words, a proposed attack must target an object that has an 
“inherent characteristic or attribute which contributes to 
military action.”78 Focusing on the second aspect of the definition 
of a military objective, the “effective contribution” of the object 
“need not be critical, or even significant” so long as it contributes 
to military action.79 While this is generally accepted as a matter 
of customary international law, the scope of the “contribution to 
military action” standard varies.80 War-fighting objects are 
objects used for combat that are usually military in nature.81 In 
the cyber context, a war-fighting object would include the 
computer guidance system in a weapon or the classified network 
on which military operations are planned and executed. “War-
supporting objects are those used to directly buttress the war 
effort . . . .”82 This would include the factory that makes the 
computer guidance system for a weapon or the proprietary 
software for a classified network. “There is universal agreement 
that war-fighting and war-supporting objects can qualify as 
military objectives on [the bases of nature, location, purpose, or 
 
 76. See Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 70, at 395. 
 77. Yoram Dinstein, The Principle of Distinction and Cyber War in 
International Armed Conflicts, 17 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 261, 263 (2012). 
 78. Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 70, at 392. 
 79. Id. at 391. 
 80. See DINNISS, supra note 11, at 188. 
 81. See Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 70, at 393. 
 82. Id. at 394. 
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use].”83 However, and of particular relevance in the cyberwar 
context, the United States includes war-sustaining objects as 
lawful military objectives.84 The U.S. Commander’s Handbook 
on the Law of Naval Operations defines war-sustaining objects 
as “economic objects of the enemy that indirectly but effectively 
support and sustain the enemy’s war-fighting capability . . . .”85 
This bears a significant impact with respect to cyberwar.86 By 
dramatically increasing the number of potentially valid military 
targets that comport with the principle of distinction, the United 
States and those States that may adopt the war-sustaining 
interpretation undercut the protection offered by IHL to the 
civilian population. While the interpretation of war-sustaining 
objects as potential military objectives in cyberwar was rejected 
in the Tallinn Manual,87 it remains the practice of the United 
States in the kinetic context and would reasonably continue to 
be so in the cyberwar context as well. 
However, use of the Internet and cyber systems by military 
personnel does not ipso facto make them a proper object of 
attack. Military use of computers and cyber systems may be for 
non-hostilities related purposes.88 These uses may include email 
and phone services to communicate with family members or pay 
bills.89 The experts drafting the Tallinn Manual did not reach 
consensus on whether such use of civilian systems subjected the 
systems to attack.90 The debate focused on whether morale of the 
troops constitutes a military advantage, with the majority of 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 8-3 
(July 2007), http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/NWP_1-14M_Commanders_
Handbook.pdf; see also, 10 U.S.C. § 950p(a)(1) (2015) (defining a military 
objective for military commissions as including war-sustaining capabilities). 
But see Yoram Dinstein, Legitimate Military Objectives Under the Current Jus 
In Bello, 78 INT’L L. STUD. 139, 145–46 (stating that war sustaining objects do 
not qualify as military objectives). 
 86. See, e.g., DINNISS, supra note 11, at 189 (“[T]he US targeting of war-
sustaining capabilities moves the target of military operations away from 
military effort of the enemy and onto the political command and control system 
and its resource base . . . .”). 
 87. See generally TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 441 (rejecting the 
notion that war-sustaining objects are military objectives when applied to the 
cyberwar arena). 
 88. See id. at 444. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. 
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experts concluding it does not constitute an advantage that 
would subject the otherwise civilian cyber systems to targeting.91 
c. Nature, Location, Purpose, and Use 
The second portion of the first prong looks at the 
characterization of the object. In the cyber context, “[t]he key 
words here are ‘nature, location, purpose, or use.’”92 In cyberwar, 
distinguishing between nature, location, use, and purpose may 
be particularly difficult given the nature of cyberspace. 
“The ‘nature’ of a military objective refers to its ‘inherent 
characteristic or attribute which contributes to military 
action.’”93 Military networks, long-haul communication systems 
used by the military, and the computer systems in weapons are 
all, by their nature, valid military objects in the context of 
cyberwar. 
“Location” refers to geography that is of special importance 
to the military action.94 While one may think of cyberspace in 
the abstract, the servers, routers, switches, and computers that 
comprise networks all physically reside somewhere. Therefore, 
location may be achieved by noting that a particular router or 
switch connects to a military air defense radar, or that the likely 
communications pathway for a certain piece of data is to transit 
a particular network, based upon the particular software and 
services used to transmit the data. Additionally, “there may be 
circumstances where it is important to deny a network or other 
object to the enemy where its location does play a role in 
computer network attacks”95 (e.g., a civilian wireless network 
upon which the military is piggy-backing). Similarly, an attack 
on a SCADA system that results in water being released from a 
dam and denying an area to the adversary may qualify as a 
military objective under the location test because, while the land 
area is the actual object of attack, the SCADA system is merely 
the means to deny the location to the adversary.96 
“‘[U]se’ pertains to how an object is currently being 
employed.”97 “The criterion applies in the case of civilian objects 
 
 91. See id. 
 92. Dinstein, supra note 77, at 263. 
 93. Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 70, at 392. 
 94. Id. 
 95. DINNISS, supra note 11, at 185–86. 
 96. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 438. 
 97. Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 70, at 393. 
436 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:2 
that are being used for military purposes, but only during the 
period of use.”98 In cyberwar, it is rare that the use of a cyber 
objective or infrastructure would transition exclusively from 
civilian to military. This is a direct result of the architecture of 
networks and cyber systems, as discussed in Part II. Rather, the 
more likely, and arguably harder determination, is whether the 
targeting of a dual-use cyber object, one that serves both a 
civilian and a military purpose, complies with the principle of 
distinction. Of note, the dual-use may occur simultaneously, as 
in the case of a server hosting both a civilian website and a 
military propaganda website. This is particularly complicated 
because “most Internet infrastructure can serve as a dual-use 
object because military systems are so often interwoven with 
civilian infrastructure.”99 
By way of example, “the US military’s global 
communications backbone consists of seven million computing 
devices on thousands of networks across hundreds of 
installations” spread around the world.100 As stated in Part II, 
cyberspace is man-made. The majority of the infrastructure that 
comprises it was funded through private investment and its use 
is predominantly private.101 Additionally, the nature of the 
TCP/IP algorithm causes even military communications to be 
separated into data packets, “all of which may travel via 
different (civilian) channels and typically traverse various 
civilian systems . . . .”102 That is not to say that an attack against 
dual-use infrastructure is unlawful. It is widely accepted in IHL 
that a dual-use object is a lawful military objective for the 
purpose of targeting regardless of the extent of the military 
use.103 This interpretation of dual-use objects was affirmed in 
the cyberwar context by the international group of experts that 
drafted the Tallinn Manual and is implicitly recognized in the 
United States DOD Law of War manual.104 Thus in cyberwar, 
significant components of the Internet and cyber systems qualify 
as a dual-use objects. 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Gervais, supra note 10, at 568. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. at 568. 
 102. Geiß & Lahmann, supra note 67, at 385. 
 103. See Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Cyber Warfare: Quo Vadis?, 25 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 269, 298 (2014). 
 104. See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 36; TALLINN MANUAL, 
supra note 4, at 435–48. 
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Also complicating the ‘use’ standard is the widespread 
production of computers and cyber systems that are not 
specifically intended for the military but which are frequently 
used by military forces.105 In analyzing the ‘use’ standard, the 
experts drafting the Tallinn Manual agreed that “whether such 
a factory [i.e., computer production facility] qualifies as a 
military objective by use depends on the scale, scope, and 
importance of the military acquisitions . . . .”106 However, the 
drafting experts were unable to determine any precise 
thresholds, leaving little clarity to the standard to apply.107 
“‘Purpose’ denotes the intended future use of the object.”108 
There is no requirement to wait for cyber infrastructure to 
actually be used before it may be a lawful military object.109 So 
long as a State has reason to believe its adversary intends to use 
the cyber infrastructure for military purposes, even at a later 
date, the purpose criterion is satisfied.110 Therefore, if a State 
has intelligence that the adversary is about to purchase specific 
computer hardware or software that will make a military 
contribution, or use a particular civilian satellite provider for 
such a purpose, those objects are then legitimate military 
objectives.111 
The issues surrounding ‘purpose’ are highlighted by the 
recent use (e.g., command and control, propaganda, inciting 
violence) of social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, etc.) by parties 
to a conflict.112 Therefore, one may reasonably conclude that 
Facebook and Twitter may be properly classified as military 
objectives subject to cyber attack. 113 In addressing the potential 
targeting of social media, the experts drafting the Tallinn 
Manual concluded that only those portions of Facebook and 
 
 105. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 439. 
 106. Id. at 439. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 70, at 393. 
 109. See Geiß & Lahmann, supra note 67, at 385; see also TALLINN MANUAL, 
supra note 4, at 439–40. 
 110. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 99–100 (2d ed. 2010); see also Schmitt & 
Widmar, supra note 70, at 392 (discussing the ability to deduce intended use 
based upon intelligence collection). 
 111. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 439. 
 112. Id. at 446. 
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operation against Facebook or Twitter would even rise to the level of an ‘attack’ 
under IHL. Id. 
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Twitter used for military purposes may be attacked.114 
Nevertheless, at least significant portions of popular social 
media sites may lawfully be subject to cyber attack for the 
purpose of disrupting enemy command and control and for 
countering propaganda. 
IHL does not, however, provide any standards of reliability 
of information or likelihood of use.115 Therefore, considering the 
nature of the technology, as discussed in Part II, and the 
application of the ‘purpose’ analysis from IHL—reason to believe 
there is intended future military use—there are a significantly 
greater number of civilian objects that may lawfully be attacked 
as military objectives in cyberwar. Furthermore, because there 
is no threshold of reliability of intelligence or certainty standard 
for future use, this leaves open a large number of civilian objects 
to the subjective decision-making of military commanders. 
d. Military Advantage from Destruction, Capture, or 
Neutralization 
The second prong of the definition of a military objective 
states that the destruction, capture, or neutralization of the 
object, under the circumstances at the time, must offer a definite 
military advantage.116 While there is no specific significance 
associated with the use of the word “definite,” some 
commentators have concluded that it requires the military 
advantage to be “concrete and perceptible” as opposed to 
“hypothetical and speculative.”117 Potential or indeterminate 
advantages are insufficient to meet the standard.118 
Additionally, the advantage gained must be military in nature 
and is assessed by reference to the advantage gained from the 
attack as a whole, not just from parts or portions of an attack.119 
For example, an attack on one transmission tower that is part of 
a broader attack on command and control networks would be 
viewed as a single, all-encompassing attack on command and 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 439. 
 116. Geiβ & Lahmann, supra note 67, at 387. 
 117. DINNISS, supra note 11, at 190; DINSTEIN, supra note 110, at 106. 
 118. CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 636 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) 
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 119. DINNISS, supra note 11, at 191; see also TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 
4, at 131. 
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control for the purpose of determining the military advantage.120 
Furthermore, the military advantage analysis focuses on the 
“commander’s intent in determining whether or not an object 
constitutes a military objective rather than actual effect as 
determined subsequently.”121 In other words, the attack cannot 
be designed purely to achieve a political advantage, although the 
attack may provide a political benefit in addition to military 
advantage.122 As Dinniss notes, in the age of cyberwar, “the 
individual targeting of small parts of an integrated system will 
accumulate to contribute to a military advantage that would not 
necessarily eventuate from neutralising [sic] a single part of the 
system.”123 
Targeting a military computer system that will only disable 
or destroy the system or otherwise impact only the system, and 
not otherwise affect civilians or civilian objects (including 
civilian systems), will not violate the principle of distinction. 
Similarly, targeting a civilian academic research computer 
system that has no current or future military use and is not 
otherwise part of any war-fighting or war-supporting effort will 
clearly violate the principle of distinction. Unfortunately, 
modern computer systems and the interconnected nature of 
networks, as discussed in Part II, rarely yield such bright-line 
distinctions. 
3. General Precautions and Discrimination 
In addition to, but separate from, the technical distinction 
analysis are the requirements of general precautions and 
discrimination. Under Article 57 of AP I, when there is a choice 
between several military objectives for obtaining a similar 
military advantage, the attacker must select the objective which 
“may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and 
to civilian objects.”124 More specifically, Article 57 requires those 
who plan and authorize attacks to: (1) do everything feasible to 
 
 120. See ICTY, Final Report of to the Prosecutor of the Committee 
Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, ICTY (2000) ¶¶ 72, 78, http://www.icty.org/en/press/
final-report-prosecutor-committee-established-review-nato-bombing-
campaign-against-federal. 
 121. DINNISS, supra note 11, at 193. 
 122. DINSTEIN, supra note 110, at 107. 
 123. DINNISS, supra note 11, at 191–92. 
 124. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 57(3). 
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ensure the object of the attack is a military objective and not 
otherwise protected under the Protocol; (2) take all feasible 
precautions in the choice of means and methods to avoid or at 
least minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
and damage to civilian objects; and (3) refrain from launching an 
attack which “may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”125 In this 
regard, Article 57 “requires attackers to take ‘constant care’ and 
‘all reasonable precautions’ to spare the civilian population and 
civilian objects.”126 
AP I further delineates indiscriminate attacks in Article 
51(4). Specifically, attacks that: (1) “are not directed at a specific 
military objective,” (2) “employ a method or means . . . which 
cannot be directed at a specific military objective,” or (3) “employ 
a method or means . . . the effects of which cannot be limited as 
required by this Protocol” violate IHL.127 The second prong of 
Article 51(4) requires States to employ cyber weapons that are 
capable of distinguishing between military objectives and 
civilian objects.128 In this regard, the cyber weapon must be able 
to discriminate between the two types of objects—civilian and 
military. Therefore, a commander has complied with the rule so 
long as the commander and his or her subordinates have taken 
“reasonable precautions,” employed a cyber weapon that is 
capable of “discrimination,” and targeted a valid military 
objective, even if the cyber weapon unexpectedly malfunctions or 
goes awry and attacks civilian objects.129 However, if the cyber 
weapon is unable to be limited in retransmission or otherwise 
limited in the scope as to which cyber systems it attacks, either 
through built-in code or additional intervention, then the 
weapon is indiscriminate and prohibited.130 
Building upon the difficulties detailed above, as a general 
proposition, a cyber attack is often preferable to a kinetic strike 
in that it is assumed a cyber attack generally will cause less 
 
 125. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(i)–(iii). 
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physical damage and fewer civilian deaths.131 “When a choice is 
possible between several military objectives for obtaining a 
similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be 
[the one] . . . expected to cause the least damage to civilian lives 
and to civilian objects.”132 Therefore, on a macro scale, applying 
the third section of Article 57 and assuming a cyber attack is less 
likely to result in physical injury, destruction, or death, a cyber 
attack will almost always be preferable to a kinetic strike. But, 
on a micro scale, “[m]ilitary systems are usually more secure 
than civilian systems.”133 Therefore, recalling the technology 
discussion from Part II and the interconnected nature of military 
and civilian systems, it is easier to launch a cyber attack against 
civilian infrastructure the military relies on (i.e., dual-use 
systems or systems that meet the ‘purpose’ standard under the 
description of a military objective) than to launch a cyber attack 
against purely military cyber infrastructure.134 This may have 
the unintended result of increasing the adverse impacts of war 
on the civilian population. This risk is recognized in the DOD 
Law of War manual in that it notes the “obligation to take 
feasible precautions may be of greater relevance in cyber 
operations . . . because this obligation applies to a broader set of 
activities than those to which other law of war rules apply.”135 
While the requirement to take feasible precautions applies, the 
general requirement does not offer the same degree of protection 
for civilian objects as application of the principle of distinction. 
4. What Constitutes an Attack Under International 
Humanitarian Law? 
One must note that the term “attack” as used in IHL is 
fundamentally different from the traditional notion of a cyber 
attack. In a colloquial sense, the term “cyber attack” has a broad 
meaning and encompasses everything from cyber espionage and 
hacking, to a denial of service attack or a complicated cyber 
attack designed to destroy an object or cause it to be destroyed 
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(e.g., Stuxnet).136 Additional definitions of cyber attack can be 
found in academic literature.137 
In IHL, the term “attack” has a specific meaning and is the 
subject of regulation under applicable treaties. Article 49 of 
Additional Protocol I defines attacks as “acts of violence against 
the adversary.”138 Of note, Article 49 applies to “all attacks in 
whatever territory conducted.”139 Additionally, Article 49 
applies to air, sea, and land warfare which may affect individual 
civilians, the civilian population or civilian objects on land.140 
Further, Article 52 of Additional Protocol I states that civilian 
objects may not be the “object of attack.”141 
The Tallinn Manual concluded that, for a cyber operation to 
be subject to the targeting rules under IHL, the operation must 
constitute an attack.142 Similarly, the DOD Law of War manual 
also concludes that cyberspace operations amounting to an 
attack are subject to the principles of IHL, including distinction 
and proportionality.143 Therefore, cyber operations that fall 
short of the definition of an attack are not governed by the IHL 
principles of distinction and proportionality.144 The Tallinn 
 
 136. See Blank, supra note 50; see also Bob Violino, Unseen, All-Out Cyber 
War on the U.S. Has Begun, INFOWORLD (January 28, 2013), 
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2612825/hacking/unseen--all-out-cyber-war-
on-the-u-s--has-begun.html; Lubell, supra note 70, at 255. 
 137. See, e.g., Gervais, supra note 10, at 533 (“The premeditated use of 
disruptive activities, or the threat thereof, against computers and/or networks, 
with the intention to cause harm or to further social, ideological, religious, 
political, or similar objectives. Or to intimidate any person in furtherance of 
such objectives.”) (citing U.S. ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND, DCSINT 
HANDBOOK NO. 102, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE THREATS AND TERRORISM, VII-
2 (2006)); Lubell, supra note 70, at 255; Gary D. Solis, Cyber Warfare, 219 MIL. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (2014); Jeffrey T.G. Kelsey, Note, Hacking into International 
Humanitarian Law: The Principles of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of 
Cyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1427, 1443 (2008);. Cf. DOD LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL, supra note 36, § 16.5.2 (providing examples of what would NOT 
constitute an attack). 
 138. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 49. 
 139. Id. art. 49(2). 
 140. Id. art. 49(3). 
 141. Id. art. 52. 
 142. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 423. 
 143. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 36, § 16.5.1. 
 144. However, as detailed in Article 52 of AP I, and as the Tallinn Manual 
recognizes in Rule 114, there are other generally applicable protections in effect 
during all cyber operations that are designed to spare the civilian population 
from unnecessarily suffering the effects of military operations. See TALLINN 
MANUAL, supra note 4, at 477; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 36, § 
16.5.1. 
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Manual defines a cyber attack as “a cyber operation, whether 
offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause 
injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.”145 
The Tallinn Manual notes that the term “acts of violence” in the 
definition of attacks in Article 49(1) of AP I should not be read 
as limited to kinetic action; rather it is the nature of the effect 
caused by the action that determines if it is an attack.146 In this 
regard, the determination of whether a cyber operation 
constitutes an attack is an effects-based analysis. The Manual 
states that the focus must be on the consequences of an operation 
rather than on its nature.147 Therefore, cyber espionage, 
psychological operations, and other non–violent operations (i.e., 
operations that do not result in kinetic-like effects) do not 
constitute attacks.148 That is not to say that all effects which 
cause damage or destruction amount to an attack under IHL. De 
minimis damage or destruction does not rise to the level of harm 
required.149 Thus, the focus of the definition of a cyber attack, for 
the purposes of IHL and this Article, is whether the effect can 
reasonably be expected to cause more than de minimis damage 
to or destruction of objects.150 Because determination of whether 
an action constitutes a cyber “attack” is an effects-based 
determination, an operation targeting data that “results in the 
. . . damage or destruction of physical objects . . . qualifies as an 
attack.”151 However, targeting that results in de minimis 
damage or no loss of functionality is not an attack and, therefore, 
all the protections afforded civilian objects subject to an attack 
by the principles of distinction and proportionality do not 
apply.152 
Additional Protocol I uses the term “attack,” as well as the 
term “operation,” in describing actions taken against military 
 
 145. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 415. 
 146. Id. at 415–16. 
 147. Id. at 415. 
 148. Id.. The Tallinn Manual relies on the International Court of Justice’s 
decision in Tadic, which stated, inter alia, that chemical, biological, and 
radiological attacks do not usually have “kinetic effect” on their designated 
target but still constitute attacks as a matter of law. See also DOD LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL, supra note 36, § 16.5.2. 
 149. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 416. 
 150. Id. (citing Protocol I, supra note 2, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b), 
35(3), 55(1), and 56(1)). 
 151. Id. at 416. 
 152. However, as the Tallinn Manual notes, other relevant provisions of IHL 
(e.g., constant care (Rule 114) and the prohibition on collective punishment 
(Rule 144)) apply. Id. at 418. 
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objectives.153 Despite the use of both terms, the primary focus of 
AP I is on attacks. In other words, while the term “operation” is 
used to generally describe actions of the military, the focus is on 
protecting civilians and civilian objects from harms associated 
with attacks. Specifically, Article 48 of AP I states that parties 
must direct their “operations” only against military objectives.154 
In fact, throughout AP I there is an emphasis on “restricting 
military operations by reference to attacks.”155 Thus the 
reference in Article 48 to operations “must be interpreted as 
bearing on a particular type of operation, an attack.”156 
Alternatively, one could argue that the principles of distinction 
and proportionality apply to both operations and attacks. 
However, this argument fails to account for the specific words 
found in the Articles and is not supported in the literature 
interpreting AP I.157 
The practical implication of the interpretation of what 
constitutes an attack for purposes of IHL is that the principle of 
distinction offers little protection for civilian data in cyberwar.158 
“The principle of protection of the civilian population is 
inseparable from the principle of the distinction . . . between 
military and civilian persons. In view of the latter principle it is 
essential to have clear definitions of each of these categories.”159 
Therefore, clarity in application of the principle of distinction 
and definitional clarity in the words comprising the principle are 
necessary to ensure protection of civilians, the civilian 
population, and civilian objects. 
 
 153. See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 51. 
 154. Id. art. 48. 
 155. Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus In Bello: Key Issues, 
87 NAVAL WAR COL. INT’L L. STUD. 89, 92 (2011). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4; Schmitt, supra note 155, at 
92. 
 158. See Schmitt, supra note 103, at 298; see also, TALLINN MANUAL, supra 
note 4, at 416–19, 423 (stating that depending on the circumstances, an attack 
that causes significant damage to civilian objects might violate the principle of 
proportionality (Rule 113)—not the principle of distinction). 
 159. AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 118, at 610. 
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C. PROPORTIONALITY IN CYBERWAR 
1. Proportionality Generally 
Distinction is not the only relevant IHL principle when 
discussing protection of civilians and civilian objects from the 
harms of cyberwar. Proportionality plays a large role in 
targeting decisions but, due to the narrow interpretation of the 
scope of attacks regulated by IHL, proportionality also falls short 
of the goal of protecting the civilian population. The principle of 
proportionality underpins the prohibition on indiscriminate 
attacks,160 and is designed to overcome the otherwise 
“inadequate” protection offered to the civilian population, 
civilians and civilian property by the principle of distinction.161 
The principle is codified in Article 51(5)(b) of AP I and prohibits 
“an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”162 
Underscoring the importance of the proportionality analysis, 
Article 57(2)(a)(iii) repeats the standard and precludes those 
planning, launching or executing attacks from proceeding with 
the attack if it becomes apparent that the attack would violate 
the principle.163 
The principle of proportionality is considered a principle of 
customary international law and applies in both international 
and non–international armed conflicts.164 “Proportionality 
governs the degree and kind of force used to achieve a military 
objective by comparing the expected military advantage gained 
to the expected incidental damage caused to civilians and 
civilian objects.”165 In this regard, it is a balancing test of 
suffering and damage versus military advantage.166 Although a 
commander only need engage in a proportionality analysis if, 
after reviewing a target, he concludes there are civilians or 
civilian objects in the area and, therefore, there could be 
 
 160. DINNISS, supra note 11, at 205. 
 161. Richmond, supra note 29, at 879. 
 162. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 51(5)(b). 
 163. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii). 
 164. See GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF 
WAR 83–84 (2d ed. 2015). 
 165. Gervais, supra note 10, at 571. 
 166. Schmitt, supra note 130, at 391–92. 
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collateral damage,167 the nature of computers and cyber 
systems—the interconnectedness and reliance on civilian 
infrastructure—will almost always necessitate a proportionality 
analysis.168 Proportionality seeks to preclude “reckless” attacks 
but does not limit commanders to a single course of action.169 
Additionally, the principle requires consideration of both direct 
and knock-on or indirect effects of attacks.170 
In applying the principle of proportionality, the applicable 
standard is that of a reasonable commander based upon the 
circumstances known at the time she/he launched the attack.171 
Furthermore, the principle of proportionality is “among the most 
complex and misunderstood in [IHL] with respect to both 
interpretation and application.”172 This is a direct result of 
counter-intuitive application of the rule. The principle of 
proportionality is an ex ante analysis, rendering the ex post facto 
consequences irrelevant for determining whether or not the 
principle of proportionality has been violated.173 In other words, 
if a cyber attack is reasonably expected to cause a temporary 
disruption to a public-facing website but actually results in an 
unanticipated destruction of a server hosting medical records 
and leading to patient deaths, the principle of proportionality is 
met so long as the expected temporary disruption to the public-
facing website would not be excessive in light of the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated from the attack.174 
Recognizing the difficulty of this analysis, the commentary 
accompanying AP I recognizes a need for “complete good faith on 
the part of the belligerents, as well as the desire to conform to 
the general principle of respect for the civilian population.”175 
 
 167. CORN ET AL., supra note 164, at 84. 
 168. Presumably, it is possible for a military objective to be so remote and 
disconnected from all civilian objects yet still susceptible to a cyber attack that 
it is conceivable, but unlikely, that a proportionality analysis would not be 
required. An example would be an air-gapped military system accessed directly 
by a team of special operations forces at a remote location that is not otherwise 
connected to any civilian cyber systems, and where no civilians or civilian 
objects are present. 
 169. See Gervais, supra note 10, at 572. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Blank & Guiora, supra note 62, at 57. 
 172. Schmitt, supra note 59, at 18. 
 173. Id. at 18 n.59. 
 174. See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 36, §16.5.2 (stating that 
temporary disruption does not amount to an attack under IHL and, therefore, 
is not subject to the principle of proportionality). 
 175. AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 118, at 625. 
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Finally, the principle of proportionality exists to protect civilians 
and civilian objects, but not combatants or military objectives.176 
Although the focus of IHL is to protect civilians and civilian 
objects from the harms of war, “not every inconvenience to 
civilians ought to be considered relevant to . . . the principle of 
proportionality.”177 According to Dinstein, “[o]nly loss of life, 
injury to human beings and (more than nominal) damage to 
property count.”178 
2. Proportionality in the Context of Cyber Attacks 
In cyberwar, the overarching question as to the principle of 
proportionality’s success in protecting a civilian population will 
largely turn on what the specific terms mean within the 
principle and how they are applied to cyber attacks. For 
example, the term “object” for the purpose of a proportionality 
analysis has the same meaning as an “object” in the distinction 
analysis.179 Thus, the principle of proportionality, again, has a 
large gap with respect to data. This is especially the case because 
“the importance of data usually exceeds that of [its] physical 
manifestation.”180 Presently, a reasonable interpretation of IHL 
would cause a commander to select a cyber attack that may 
result in collateral damage destroying terabytes of data 
including medical records and other key pieces of civilian data, 
over a kinetic strike that is expected to result in, for example, 
three civilian casualties. Similarly, determining what 
constitutes “damage” in cyberspace will be key to ascertaining 
adequate protections. For example, a cyber attack may result in 
a range of effects from those that result in temporary, reversible 
loss of use, to those that cause physical damage and destruction. 
Determining which of these effects constitutes “damage” for the 
purpose of IHL is a necessary predicate to ascertaining whether 
the injury or damage is excessive in relation to the direct and 
concrete military advantage anticipated. Furthermore, because 
the principle is “couched in language of expectation and 
anticipation,”181 the ability to assess expected collateral damage 
 
 176. Dinstein, supra note 77, at 269–70. 
 177. Id. at 270; see also DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 36, 
§ 16.5.1.1. 
 178. See Dinstein, supra note 77, at 270. 
 179. Schmitt, supra note 103, at 297. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Dinstein, supra note 77, at 270. 
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from a cyber attack is of paramount importance. The experts 
drafting the Tallinn Manual recognized the unique nature of the 
proportionality analysis in cyberwar. In the commentary to rule 
113 (Proportionality), the experts noted that “a cyber attack can 
cause collateral damage during transit and because of the cyber 
attack itself.”182 In the traditional kinetic attack, there is a 
mechanism to ascertain the likely collateral damage—the 
collateral damage estimate methodology (“CDEM”).183 However, 
to date, no such system exists for cyberwar. 
a.  Loss of Functionality 
The experts contributing to the Tallinn Manual noted that, 
in some circumstances, the loss of functionality, as previously 
discussed in connection with attacks, may constitute damage to 
civilian objects.184 For example, the majority of experts agreed 
an impairment of functionality that requires replacement of 
physical components constitutes an attack185 and, in the context 
of proportionality, would constitute collateral damage if it 
occurred to a civilian object. However, the same experts were 
split as to whether reinstallation of an operating system was a 
sufficient impairment of functionality as to constitute “damage” 
in determining whether an operation is an attack.186 
Incorporating this interpretation into the proportionality 
analysis demonstrates that it remains unclear whether a 
functional impairment that requires significant software 
reinstallation would constitute “damage” for the purpose of a 
collateral damage assessment. Therefore, the precise scope of 
impairment of functionality and its corresponding application in 
the proportionality analysis remain unclear under the principles 
of IHL as espoused in the rules of the Tallinn Manual. 
b. What is Excessive? 
Given the relevant infancy of cyberwar, the Tallinn Manual 
commentary to Rule 113 (Proportionality) notes that extensive 
and excessive are not synonymous, yet it offers little by way of 
 
 182. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 471. 
 183. Schmitt, supra note 59, at 19. 
 184. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 472. 
 185. Id. at 416. 
 186. Id. at 417. 
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guidance and clarification.187 “The term ‘excessive’ is not defined 
in international law.”188 The Tallinn Manual, citing the Air 
Warfare Manual, notes that determining excessiveness is not a 
purely mathematical comparison of civilian casualties and 
enemy combatants.189 The experts, adopting a position that is 
against the ICRC Commentary,190 go on to state that, “extensive 
collateral damage may be legal if the anticipated concrete and 
direct military advantage is sufficiently great.”191 In other 
words, under the Tallinn Manual model, there may be a 
significant amount (extensive) collateral damage that is lawful 
(not excessive) under a proportionality analysis so long as the 
concrete and direct military advantage is sufficiently great. 
Whether that is what the contributors to the Tallinn Manual 
intended is unclear because in developing Rule 113, the experts 
failed to articulate in any significant detail exactly how the rule 
will apply. However, this may, in part, be a result of the 
subjective nature of the principle. 
c. Knock-On Effects 
Complicating the proportionality analysis in cyberwar are 
knock-on effects. A knock-on effect is an indirect or 
reverberating effect of a military attack.192 “[T]here is a 
qualitative difference between attacks designed to gain direct 
control of a physical object and cause it to act in a specific 
planned way, and attacks targeting the networks and data 
themselves, aiming for more generalized knock-on [or indirect] 
effects.”193 Attacks generating collateral knock-on effects are 
possible in cyberwar given the interconnected nature of 
computers and cyber systems.194 Recognizing this risk, the 
Tallinn Manual states that “indirect effects of a cyber attack 
comprise ‘the delayed and/or displaced second-, third- and 
 
 187. See id. at 473. 
 188. Id. at 473. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See generally AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 118, at 626 (discussing 
how Article 48 and paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 51 of Additional Protocol I 
state that there is no “justification for attacks which cause extensive civilian 
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 191. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 473. 
 192. See Schmitt, supra note 130, at 392. 
 193. Lubell, supra note 70, at 256. 
 194. DINNISS, supra note 11, at 207–08; see also Schmitt, supra note 130, at 
393. 
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higher-order consequences of action, created through 
intermediate events or mechanisms.’”195 Nevertheless, what 
remains unclear is “how many levels of these cascading effects 
will need to be taken into account.”196 For example, Michael 
Schmitt argues that all reasonably foreseeable effects must be 
considered, regardless of what tier they may be.197 Schmitt’s 
position, not surprisingly, is reflected in the Tallinn Manual in 
the commentary to Rule 113, which states that any expected 
indirect effects must be factored into the proportionality 
analysis.198 However, the literature does not indicate that any 
State has expressed with fidelity or precision to what extent 
indirect or knock-on effects will be considered in cyberwar.199 
Additionally, and as previously noted, what level of detail is 
sufficient for a commander to reasonably rely upon in making 
the collateral damage determination remains unclear. This is 
where a detailed understanding and mapping of networks and 
infrastructure is of paramount importance in cyberwar.200 
What the traditional proportionality analysis fails to 
address is that, as a man-made system, computers and cyber 
systems can, and often do, change dramatically in short amounts 
of time. In other words, what is saved on a server now and what 
is saved on that server in 15 minutes may be vastly different. 
This poses a unique problem in that the rapidly evolving nature 
of cyber systems, coupled with an ex ante analysis, means that 
the principle of proportionality may be complied with despite the 
massive collateral effect associated with unexpected or 
unanticipated data resident on a system that is subject to attack. 
 
 195. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4, at 472 (referring to JOINT CHIEFS OF 
STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-60: JOINT TARGETING I-10 (2007)); see also JOINT CHIEFS 
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utilization of the Department of Defense Collateral Damage Estimation 
Methodology to ascertain the scope and extent of expected collateral effect). 
 196. DINNISS, supra note 11, at 208. 
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While every environment is subject to change and while an ex 
ante analysis is the standard for a proportionality analysis in all 
types of warfare, the speed and magnitude with which changes 
occur in cyber systems, as discussed in Part II, further erode the 
protection afforded to civilians by the principle of 
proportionality. 
Applying the principles of IHL to cyberwar is generally 
difficult, and particularly so with respect to the principle of 
proportionality. “[I]nternational humanitarian law governing 
the conduct of hostilities is premised on a paradigm in which 
most of the deleterious consequences that it seeks to temper are 
physically destructive or injurious. Cyber operations deviate 
from this underlying paradigm.”201 Therefore, potential 
solutions must be sought to ensure adequate protection of the 
civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. “The nature of 
combat in new warfare also demands a more nuanced 
understanding of the factors to include in a proportionality 
analysis and how to weigh those factors.”202 
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE CONUNDRUM 
The debate regarding whether IHL applies to cyberspace is 
largely settled.203 However, the adequacy of existing IHL rules 
when applied to cyberwar remains in question. Key deficiencies 
in the application of the principles of distinction and 
proportionality to cyberwar are the definition and scope of what 
constitutes a civilian object versus a military objective, 
determining what constitutes and how to calculate damage in 
cyberwar, and ascertaining the scope and extent of indirect or 
knock-on effects. “Scholars generally divide into two camps on 
whether current LOAC rules adequately regulate cyberwar: 
those that believe that current LOAC rules can adequately 
address cyber war and those that believe new treaties will be 
necessary to regulate it effectively.”204 While the debate remains 
among scholars, generally, governments believe existing law, 
including IHL, is sufficient.205 However, as previously discussed, 
 
 201. Schmitt, supra note 103, at 289. 
 202. Blank & Guiora, supra note 62, at 66. 
 203. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 4; see generally Koh, supra note 36 
(discussing how IHL applies across cyberspace). 
 204. Richmond, supra note 29, at 865. 
 205. Id. (citing Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and 
Use Under International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 121, 124 (2009)). 
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governments have failed to articulate in any appreciable detail 
how the principles of IHL apply in the case of operations that 
destroy data or temporarily interfere with functionality.206 
Developing solutions to the applicability of IHL in cyberwar 
requires a review of the underlying paradigm. Specifically, IHL 
is “premised on a paradigm [where the adverse effects] . . . it 
seeks to temper are physically destructive or injurious.”207 Parts 
II and III of this Article detail many cyber effects that do not 
result in traditional injury or destruction. Additionally, the 
prevalence of dual-use infrastructure significantly affects the 
traditional targeting analysis because there is a greater number 
of civilian objects that may qualify as military objectives in 
cyberwar and the precise application of the IHL principles of 
distinction and proportionality is unclear.208 Thus, the question 
remains: what actions may be taken to achieve the goal of IHL 
to protect civilians from the effects of hostilities? 
There are a multitude of options to clarify application of IHL 
to cyberwar, each with associated benefits and risks. Solutions 
include a new treaty, a new additional protocol to an existing 
treaty, and refinement through State practice to establish 
customary norms. In order to assess the adequacy and risks with 
each of the potential solutions, the goals must be further 
clarified. The underlying goal of IHL is to protect civilians. This 
goal is achieved through, among other things, the application of 
the principles of distinction and proportionality. Further 
refinement of this goal should include the use of traditional 
targeting rules, but with a clearer articulation of how traditional 
rules (e.g., distinction and proportionality) apply in cyberwar in 
light of the unique and interconnected nature of data and cyber 
infrastructure. 
In the cyberwar context, the principles of distinction and 
proportionality fail to adequately protect civilians not because of 
an inherent flaw, but rather because the application of the 
 
 206. See, e.g., ADVANCE QUESTIONS, supra note 37; JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 
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principles is unclear and suffers from a historical focus on effects 
generated from traditional kinetic warfare. As previously noted, 
the Tallinn Manual distinguishes between attacks that are 
subject to the distinction and proportionality analysis based 
upon effects, and operations that are not subject to the principles 
of distinction and proportionality but are covered by other 
aspects of IHL.209 Therefore, one may successfully assert that in 
an effects-based analysis, the reliance on the traditional 
application of the principles of IHL is sufficient in cyberwar so 
long as the attack generates a kinetic-like effect. In other words, 
so long as the cyber attack yields death, injury to persons, or 
physical damage, then the principles of distinction and 
proportionality apply to protect the civilian population and 
civilian objects. However, where a cyber attack or operation does 
not result in physical damage but rather only creates a cyber 
effect (e.g., temporary inability to access a public facing website, 
corruption, manipulation, or loss of data with no corresponding 
impact on the functionality of a cyber system, etc.), further 
clarification of the application of the principles of IHL is 
necessary. The solutions proposed in this Article address when 
an operation would rise to the level of an attack under IHL but 
yields only a cyber effect (no kinetic-like damage). The paradigm 
to be applied to operations that do not rise to this level will not 
be addressed herein. 
The solution is not merely a matter of interpretation of 
existing principles. Indeed, some experts believe that the 
existing interpretation of these principles is flawed: “[A]n 
interpretation that limits the notion of attacks to acts generating 
physical effects cannot possibly survive.”210 This interpretation 
creates risk that a broader definition of attacks may result in the 
future. Similarly, it is unrealistic to suggest that the civilian 
population may lawfully suffer significant disruption and mass 
data destruction from a cyber operation merely because a 
physical result does not occur.211 Therefore, how the protective 
goals may be realized while recognizing that war is inherently 
disruptive towards civilians requires additional definitions and 
clarity. 
Commentators have suggested that a new treaty for 
cyberspace is unrealistic and unlikely, due to the myriad issues 
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associated with cyberspace, war, and international relations.212 
Additionally, a new treaty is not necessary because IHL remains 
largely sufficient to protect civilians, even in a cyberwar where 
a cyber attack results in physical damage or destruction. 
Because an entire new protective structure is not required 
(existing IHL and its application addresses those cyberattacks 
that generate kinetic-like effects), nor is one likely to be agreed 
upon by States, a treaty is not the correct mechanism to resolve 
this issue. If sought, a new treaty is likely to be politically 
difficult as countries will seek to use this as a mechanism to 
shape their own domestic security authority, limit actions by 
other States to engage in espionage, and potentially even 
address international trade. Furthermore, given the 
interconnected nature of cyberspace, establishing even the 
issues and topics the treaty will cover would likely prove 
incredibly difficult. A second, more viable option is a new 
additional protocol—Additional Protocol IV (“AP IV”). While a 
new additional protocol is also a treaty, there is a greater 
likelihood of adoption of a protocol because a protocol 
supplements existing rules whereas a treaty would promulgate 
an entirely new rule set.213 An additional alternative to a new 
protocol, advocated by at least one expert over a decade ago, is a 
restatement of applicable jus in bello principles as was done in 
the San Remo Manual.214 While such a restatement could be 
valuable to shape State practice, it was for all intents and 
purposes accomplished in the Tallinn Manual. Assuming it 
would be similar in scope and development to the Tallinn 
Manual, it would not be binding or represent actual State 
practice. In these regards, a restatement will fail to ensure 
adequate protection for civilians and civilian objects. 
The creation of a new additional protocol, AP IV, offers the 
most effective means to provide for the protection of civilians in 
a cyberwar that does not yield kinetic-like effects. AP IV should 
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build off the work of the Tallinn Manual, however, reflecting the 
opinions and positions of States, and offer adequate protection 
for civilians while recognizing that the nature of warfare 
necessitates the use of the latest technology. With respect to 
distinction and proportionality, there are several aspects of IHL 
that should be addressed in AP IV. 
A. SOLUTIONS FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION 
First, agreement as to the status of data as an object must 
be included. This does not require a blanket statement, although 
such a statement could be made. In the absence of a blanket 
statement regarding data’s status as an object, an alternative 
would be the establishment of a test for data to determine if the 
data in question constitutes a military objective. To the extent it 
qualifies as a military objective, then it meets the standard for 
purposes of distinction and provides a piece of the balancing test 
for proportionality. Criteria for data to be considered a military 
objective should include the application of the nature, location, 
use, and purpose standard, modified for cyberwar. More 
specifically, the data itself should offer a definitive military 
advantage or demonstrable military purpose to qualify as a 
military objective. Data meeting this standard could include 
logistical data regarding shipping times and locations for 
military equipment and personnel; data containing personnel 
qualification standards; electronic copies of war or contingency 
plans; and data containing demographic, or other aspects of a 
targeted group for developing a military information support 
operation campaign. The corollary is that all data that is not a 
military objective should be treated as civilian objects for the 
purpose of distinction and collateral damage assessments. It is 
unrealistic in an information age for data to fall outside the 
scope of constituting an object, thus failing to receive IHL 
protection associated with the principles of distinction and 
proportionality. Additionally, by defining the parameters within 
which data constitutes a valid military objective, the corollary 
establishes the non-military objective data as a civilian object 
thus clarifying the scope of the protections afforded by IHL. 
Second, additional clarification and limitation on what 
constitutes a lawful military objective should be included in AP 
IV. Specifically, the definition of dual-use objects must be 
clarified. Presently, a significant portion of the internet 
backbone and cyber systems may constitute a legitimate 
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military objective, afforded only the protection of the principle of 
proportionality. To ensure adequate protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects, certain aspects of the internet’s 
infrastructure should be designated as protected objects and the 
dual-use definition for cyber systems must be modified in a 
manner that tips in favor of protection for civilians as opposed to 
the military needs of the belligerents.215 More specifically, under 
AP IV, action against dual-use infrastructure should be limited 
to the least disruptive action so as to minimize collateral effect 
against civilians and civilian objects. Additionally, AP IV should 
specifically preclude war-sustaining objects from being subject 
to cyber attack. The inclusion of war-sustaining objects as valid 
military objectives so dilutes the protection of the principle of 
distinction in cyberwar as to virtually eliminate the protection. 
Furthermore, AP IV must establish a threshold of likelihood of 
use to limit the extent to which the “purpose” test for 
determining what constitutes a military object under the 
principle of distinction. This test should set a high bar, thus 
affording civilians and civilian objects maximum protection. The 
specific nature of cyber systems relies on the resiliency of the 
networks and opening them to large-scale adverse impacts based 
upon a low threshold of likely future use fails to adequately 
protect the civilian population. 
Third, AP IV must clarify whether loss of functionality or 
destruction of data constitutes an attack for purposes of IHL. 
Additionally, for operations short of attacks, AP IV should 
expand upon Rule 114 from the Tallinn Manual and provide 
specific guidelines on how commanders may avoid unnecessary 
effects on civilians.216 Combining new rules on data with clarity 
as to the status of loss of functionality as an attack completes 
the circle with respect to the application of the principle of 
distinction in cyberwar. 
B. SOLUTIONS FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
The principle of proportionally will also benefit from 
establishment of AP IV. AP IV must clarify what constitutes 
collateral damage in a cyberwar and establish a threshold for 
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certainty that must be achieved with respect to the 
characteristics of the cyber system before it is attacked. While a 
rigid burden of proof would be unworkable in the case of war and 
constantly evolving cyber systems, the delineation of more 
specific factors to consider when determining collateral damage 
and the establishment of a subjective test for certainty with 
respect to understanding the cyber systems to be attacked will 
yield greater protection for civilians. This is the only way for the 
“good faith” reliance on the judgment of the belligerent to 
actually benefit the civilian and civilian objects. Additionally, AP 
IV must consider how the overall proportionality analysis of any 
planned attack on a military objective is considered. While a 
mathematical formula is inappropriate, at a minimum, 
thresholds and guidance must be developed to aid the 
commander in combining the physical harm to civilians with the 
loss of functionality and data from cyber systems. To that end, 
further clarifying the impact of functionality, as described in 
Part IV A will benefit the proportionality analysis by shifting the 
balance more in favor of protecting civilians and civilian objects. 
In turn, establishing formal thresholds and guidance and 
incorporating changes in the interpretation with respect to 
functionality will aid in the development of formal collateral 
damage estimation methodologies for cyber attacks. This will 
yield a more consistent and universal application of the principle 
of proportionality. 
Finally, AP IV should establish the extent to which knock-
on effects must be considered. Specifically, it should establish a 
“one-tier beyond the attack level analysis” requirement plus 
those effects that are reasonably foreseeable at the time. It is 
reasonable to require a commander to gain insight into what will 
be indirectly affected by the loss of a particular cyber system. It 
is unreasonable to expect a commander to consider 
unforeseeable second- and third-tier effects that may occur down 
the road. Additionally, given the rapidly changing nature of 
cyber systems, AP IV should establish a time period of review for 
purposes of protecting commanders when they make good faith 
judgments. In other words, so long as a commander relied upon 
information that was no more than 48 hours old in making a 
targeting decision, that will be considered reasonable for 
purposes of a good faith judgment with respect to the application 
of IHL to the facts as presented. This is especially important 
given the rapidly changing nature of cyberspace, a man-made 
domain. While establishing a time period of review will require 
intelligence assets to continually update the target package, it 
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will furnish greater protection for civilians and civilian objects 
while preserving some decision-space for a commander to 
execute the targeting process. 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS OF AP IV 
The benefits of establishing an AP IV are numerous. A new 
additional protocol would be the result of discussions and 
agreement amongst States. Thus, the public position on each of 
these issues of each of the participants would be clear at the 
outset. Additionally, AP IV would reflect the consensus of the 
international community and would then be subject to 
ratification by States. This public debate and transparency of 
process allows the civilian population, whom the new protocol 
will protect, to be engaged in its development through each 
State’s political process.217 Finally, AP IV offers the best way to 
rapidly establish protection for civilians and civilian objectives 
or, in the alternative, put them on notice of the framework under 
which they may likely suffer the harms of cyberwar. 
Despite many benefits, there are significant drawbacks and 
risks associated with AP IV as well. First, the difficulties 
associated with negotiating and bringing into force a new treaty 
for cyberspace largely exist with respect to establishing a new 
additional protocol. Yet, this is mitigated by the limited nature 
and scope of AP IV—supplementing existing rules. Second, a 
new additional protocol will likely reflect the consensus of the 
international community, that is, the lowest common agreement 
of States and thus the lowest level of protection for civilians. 
While a treaty would also reflect the consensus of the 
international community, the limited scope of AP IV and the fact 
that there is an existing body of law to build from will hopefully 
yield a level of protection for civilians that is greater than would 
otherwise be achievable with a full cyber treaty. Third, there is 
a significant chance that there will be no agreement or minimum 
ratification of AP IV. If that were to occur, the civilian population 
retains existing IHL protection and further protections would be 
the result of the negotiation process and other mechanisms, such 
as the normative process, contributing to customary 
international law. 
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Alternatively, and what the United States seeks to do,218 is 
to rely on the development of customary international law norms 
to clarify how IHL will apply in cyberwar. A significant benefit 
of this approach is reliance upon what States actually do out of 
a sense of legal obligation as opposed to what States say they 
will do. Second, this approach offers a slower development over 
time, allowing for a more thoughtful and reflective approach. 
Third, it allows the States who are actors in cyberspace to 
exercise greater influence over the development of IHL in 
cyberspace. 
Cutting against the customary normative approach is the 
nature of cyberspace operations. It is often difficult to ascertain 
what States do for policy, political, or tactical reasons, and what 
States do out of a sense of legal obligation.219 Additionally, the 
often classified nature of cyberspace operations shields them 
from the public and international community.220 Therefore, 
distilling international norms from the practice of States will be 
difficult at best. Second, the customary normative approach is 
based upon practice over time, with time being the operative 
word. This approach offers little certainty for the civilian 
population and breeds uncertainty in the application of IHL by 
States. Thus in the interim, civilians may suffer more because 
States may engage in actions that adversely impact civilian data 
and the functionality of civilian cyber systems, and States may 
be hesitant to use cyberwar, thus resulting in continued reliance 
on kinetic attacks.221 Finally, by allowing only those States that 
engage in cyberwar to establish the customary norms, it 
disproportionately places at risk the civilian population in States 
that do not actively engage in cyberwar. In other words, this 
process allows the rules to be formed by those who engage in 
cyberwar. This subjects those in States not engaging in cyberwar 
to watch from the sidelines and prepare to suffer adverse 
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consequences. While this Article notes the increasing prevalence 
of cyber capabilities, it is safe to presume that only a small 
subset of those countries with the capabilities have or do use 
them in a fashion that may be cited to develop international 
norms.222 On balance, while there are benefits to the customary 
normative approach, AP IV offers greater protection of civilians 
and is more in accord with the spirit of IHL. 
V. CONCLUSION 
One of the key purposes of IHL today is to protect the 
civilian population from the harms of hostilities. Cyberwar is the 
warfare of the future—countries are dramatically increasing 
their capability in this area. In cyberwar, the application of the 
principles of distinction and proportionality fail to adequately 
provide protection of the civilian population because the 
definitions and current application are based upon the historical 
application to kinetic warfare. Despite the public statements of 
the international community that IHL applies in cyberspace, 
there has been a lack of transparency in how States will apply 
the principles of IHL to cyberwar. While the Tallinn Manual 
takes a big first step, it is the work of experts, not States, and 
does not necessarily reflect the position States will follow when 
they engage in cyberwar. 
For reasons stated above, a cyberspace treaty is not needed 
and continued reliance on the customary normative process is 
inadequate. The best way to protect the civilian population, 
ensure equality in the establishment and development of the 
application of the IHL framework, and provide transparency for 
the civilian population and other States is to develop and ratify 
Additional Protocol IV. This Protocol would further distinguish 
what constitutes a civilian object from military objective in 
cyberspace, including with respect to data and the functionality 
of cyber systems, addressing what constitutes and how to 
calculate damage in cyberspace, and determining the scope and 
extent to which indirect or knock-on effects must be considered. 
This is the only way to ensure adequate protection for civilians 
and civilian objects in the midst of a cyberwar. 
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